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Abstract This study tested an extension of the theory of
marital timing (Oppenheimer, Am J Sociol 94:563–591,
1988) by assessing whether visible and less visible financial
assets and debt mediated the relationship between employment and the likelihood of marriage. We conducted these
prospective, longitudinal analyses using a sample of 1,522
never-married young adults from the National Survey of
Families and Households. For participants who were not
cohabiting at Wave 1, financial issues such as car values
predicted marriage but did not mediate the relationship
between work hours, occupational prestige, and the likelihood of marriage. For cohabiting participants, employment
factors were the strongest predictor of marriage.
Keywords Assets  Cohabitation  Consumer debt 
Employment  Marriage

By 1980 women had surpassed the highest recorded median
age at first marriage; in 1990 men did the same (United States
Census Bureau 2007). Since then, the median age at first
marriage has continued to rise. In 2006 it was 27.5 for men
and 25.5 for women (United States Census Bureau 2007).
Although researchers have suggested that economic issues
partly explain the rise in the increase in age at first marriage
(Oppenheimer 1988; Whitehead and Popenoe 2001), the
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details of the relationship between young adults’ financial
wellbeing and the timing of marriage remain unclear.
The theory of marital timing (Oppenheimer 1988) suggests that contemporary young adults delay marriage until
they are sure that it will be economically stable based on
their own and their partner’s employment situation.
Quantitative analyses have supported this assertion (Ahituv
and Lerman 2007; Oppenheimer 2003; Sassler and Goldscheider 2004; Sweeney 2002). Interestingly, however,
qualitative studies have found that in addition to the need
for stable employment, young adults cite other economic
issues such as savings as prerequisite to marriage (Edin
2000; Gibson-Davis et al. 2005; Smock et al. 2005). Thus,
employment may not be the only economic issue that
young adults consider when deciding to wed. Further, it is
unclear whether these alternative economic issues complement employment or whether they mediate the relationship between employment and marriage.
This study adds more detail in understanding the relationship between finances and marriage decisions. It also
tests an assumption of the marital timing theory—that
employment is the most proximal financial issue to the
marriage decision. Although employment is undeniably
important, we believe that it is more distal to marriage
decisions than other economic issues. Finally, this study
quantitatively tests findings from qualitative studies on the
relationship between economic wellbeing and marriage.
We used prospective data from the National Survey of
Families and Households (NSFH) to test these questions.
The NSFH was advantageous in that it was a nationallyrepresentative longitudinal survey with many young individuals who had never married. Further, it was one of the
only representative surveys to gather rich detail on participants’ finances. These qualities made the NSFH the best fit
for the research questions.
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Marriage Timing
Although economic issues are by no means the only considerations in the decision to wed, they are important. One
reason for the importance of economic considerations has
been the changing meanings and expectations that are
attached to marriage. As marriage becomes less common, it
has increasingly become a status symbol, a ‘‘super-relationship’’ among other adult relationships (Cherlin 2004;
Whitehead and Popenoe 2001). Additionally, young people
want to preemptively avoid divorce by marrying a compatible spouse the first time around (Bougheas and
Georgellis 1999; Oppenheimer 1988). Further, young
adults now believe they should be economically stable
prior to marrying, rather than using marriage to financially
better themselves (Smock et al. 2005; Whitehead and
Popenoe 2001). Thus, if young adults are economically
stable prior to marriage, the wedding can showcase their
elevated status, they can be more confident that the marriage will not end due to economic problems, and they can
be financially prepared if divorce does occur (Dew 2009;
Skogrand et al. 2010; Whitehead and Popenoe 2001).
Oppenheimer’s theory of marital timing (1988) asserts
that these economic and relationship norms are part of the
reason for the high age at first marriage. Oppenheimer
posits that because assessing the economic stability of a
potential partner is difficult, and because the cost of being
wrong about choosing a spouse is high, young adults may
delay marriage to ensure that a potential spouse is economically stable. The more economic uncertainty that
exists about a potential partner, the longer individuals will
postpone marriage (Oppenheimer 2003).
Oppenheimer’s (1988) main assertion is that employment
is the most important indicator of economic wellbeing.
Employment allows couples to set up independent households—a prerequisite for marriage. Employment also gives
information on a prospective spouse’s long-term economic
prospects. Finally, employment often structures couples’
lifestyles (Oppenheimer 1988; Sharpe et al. 2002). For
example, shift work or frequent travel has different marital
implications than a standard ‘‘9–5’’ 40 h work week (Presser
2000). Thus a prospective spouses’ employment may indicate how time would be allocated in a marriage.
Evidence has largely supported Oppenheimer’s theory;
employment is a good predictor of marriage—especially
men’s likelihood of marrying. The more years a man had
been employed, the more likely he was to marry (Ahituv
and Lerman 2007). Further, men who had been employed
full-time for 2 years were more likely to move straight into
marriage without cohabiting (Oppenheimer 2003).
Men’s income also relates to marriage. Salary and wagerates positively predict marriage (Ahituv and Lerman 2007;
Burgess et al. 2003; Oppenheimer 2003; Sweeney 2002;
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Xie et al. 2003). Specifically, the probability of marriage
increased .8–2.3% for every $1,000 that men earned
(Burgess et al. 2003; Oppenheimer 2003; Xie et al. 2003).
Income was also positively associated with cohabiting
men’s likelihood of marriage (Clarkberg 1999; Smock and
Manning 1997).
Research on the relationship between women’s economic variables and the likelihood of marriage has yielded
mixed results. Some studies have found no link between
women’s income, employment, and marriage (Lichter et al.
2006; Smock and Manning 1997; Xie et al. 2003). Other
studies have found a positive relationship between
women’s employment, income, and marriage (Burgess
et al. 2003; Clarkberg 1999; Wu and Pollard 2000; Sweeney 2002) or that women’s employment delays marriage
(Wong 2005).

Economic Signals, Cohabiting, and Gender
Although studies of employment, income, and the likelihood of marriage have supported predictions from the
marital timing theory, in practice the mechanisms that
young adults use to show that they are economically stable
is unknown. The question that this research addresses is
whether economic issues mediate the relationship between
employment and marriage or whether they simply complement it. In other words, this study evaluates whether
employment remains predictive of marriage after
accounting for other economic issues or whether employment is the economic foundation that bankrolls individuals’
demonstrations of economic prowess.
The theory of marital timing asserts that employment
information is central to individuals’ decisions to marry
(Oppenheimer 1988). For employment to influence marital
decisions, however, individuals would need to convey
employment information to a potential spouse. Although
telling a potential spouse where one works and what one
does may indicate what kind of lifestyle that job requires,
conveying information about one’s long-term economic
prospects might require conversations about work hours,
work history, and salary/wages. These latter issues, especially salary and wage discussions may be difficult for
couples.
Individuals often do not talk much about their finances
with their romantic partners. Such pragmatic discussions
are still considered ‘‘taboo’’ or ‘‘mercenary’’ in romantic
relationships (Blumstein and Schwartz 1983; Schwartz
et al. 1995; Shapiro 2007). Trachtman (1999) compared the
money taboo to historical prohibitions on premarital sex:
…the money taboo…results in lack of communication between couples about money. It is the rare
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couple that marries these days without having at least
some sexual knowledge of each other. It is quite
common, on the other hand, for couples to marry
without knowing anything about each other’s assets
or debts or discussing assumptions about who will
earn the money, how it will be spent, for what, or how
these decisions will be made. (p. 278)
Given the sensitive nature of discussing money, individuals may signal their economic potential to prospective
spouses through other means.
Visible Economic Signals
One of the ways that individuals might show that they are
economically stable is to convert their employment income
to desirable visible goods and services. This type of consumption serves a number of signaling purposes. In articulating the theory on conspicuous consumption, Veblen
(1899/1992) asserted that it helps upper-class individuals
maintain their social status. He also asserted that conspicuous consumption was a mechanism whereby middle- and
lower-class individuals and households could emulate
upper-class norms and thus capture a certain social dignity.
More central to this paper, however, is the idea that
accumulating more goods demonstrates that one is productive and has the wherewithal to accumulate them (Trigg
2001; Veblen 1899/1992). That is, as an individual accumulates visible goods and services (e.g., expensive clothing, meals out, concert tickets, etc.) they demonstrate that
they have financial means to live a certain lifestyle (Trigg
2001). This demonstration may help convince a potential
marriage partner that they are economically stable. We use
income as a proxy for consumption because these data lack
consumption measures.
Using an evolutionary biological perspective, psychologists have also hypothesized that displays of financial
consumption might be associated with individuals
attempting to signal different qualities to potential mates.
Consistent with this hypothesis, one experiment found that
men who were primed with romantic thoughts indicated
that they would spend more money on conspicuous consumption than men in the control group; the effect was not
replicated for women (Griskevicius et al. 2007).
Hypothesis 1a Income mediates the relationship between
employment and the likelihood of marriage.
An even more successful signaling strategy might be to
accumulate visible assets. Like conspicuous consumption,
visible assets such as cars or homes demonstrate that
individuals have sufficient means to accumulate goods.
Visible assets provide more information about a prospective spouse than simply whether they have financial means,
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however. They may indicate the type of lifestyle one can
expect following marriage. For example, if an individual
drives a flashy automobile instead of a sensible one, they
may be attempting to signal to a prospective partner that
they have material means, that they do not worry about
their finances, etc. (even if the signal is not consistent with
reality).
Visible assets may also provide potential for future
economic growth. For example, through appreciation and
equity, homes directly act as mechanisms for economic
growth and automobiles provide indirect economic utility
by facilitating and maintaining access to employment
(Garasky et al. 2006). Although we had reason to suspect
that the value of one’s home would positively predict the
likelihood of marriage, too few of the participants owned
homes at the first wave of the data for us to be able to test
this.
Hypothesis 1b Visible assets mediate the relationship
between employment and the likelihood of marriage.
Assertions that young adults use these visible means to
assess partners’ economic stability run contrary to the
theory of marital timing. The theory of marital timing
assumes that individuals are able to be adequately informed
about a prospective spouses’ economic stability by learning
about their employment situation.
Thus, one way to test these opposing assumptions would
be to examine the relationship between consumer credit
and the likelihood of marriage. Individuals often use consumer credit (such as credit cards, installment loans, etc.)
to obtain visible goods and services beyond what they can
afford. Consequently, individuals with lower paying jobs
might use consumer debt to obtain visible goods and services. If romantic partners communicated about their economic status, as the theory of marital timing asserts, then
attempting to signal economic stability using visible goods
obtained with consumer credit would not work. Indeed,
consumer debt might actually discourage marriage—especially since young single adults carry more installment debt
than other family types and because this may be a marker
for a greater willingness to take risks (Baek and Hong
2004; Worthy et al. 2010). However, obtaining visible
goods and services through consumer debt might be a
viable signaling strategy if couples do not discuss their
financial positions very deeply prior to marriage.
Hypothesis 1c Consumer debt mediates the relationship
between employment and the likelihood of marriage.
The Role of Cohabitation
Cohabiting individuals may not need to rely on visible
proxies of occupational and economic stability. Rather,
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cohabitation may provide couples information about each
others’ financial situation and decrease the need for visible
economic signals. Cohabitation now precedes over half of
first-time marriages, and has become the norm in premarital union behaviors (Bumpass and Lu 2000; Teachman
2003). One of the main reasons for cohabitation is to
augment the information gathering process (Bumpass et al.
1991).
Cohabiting may allow partners to examine each others’
economic positions more closely. For example, cohabiting
partners might see credit card statements arrive in the mail.
Further, by living together, cohabiting couples might be
better able to see how a prospective spouse approaches
saving, consumption, and other financial behaviors.
Although cohabiting couples often keep their incomes and
goods separated (Blumstein and Schwartz 1983; Heimdal
and Houseknecht 2003), cohabiting does provide better
information about how each person uses their money.
Consequently, we would expect less visible financial signals such as savings and levels of consumer debt to be
more of a factor in cohabiters’ decisions to marry.
Although the goods that are obtained through consumer
credit are visible, the actual debt itself is probably not
visible unless individuals are cohabiting.
Cohabiting individuals have referenced these economic
issues in relation to their willingness to wed. Although they
often discussed employment needs, cohabiting individuals
also said that they did not want to marry until they have
enough money saved for a ‘‘real’’ wedding, a house, or have
paid down debt (Gibson-Davis et al. 2005; Smock et al.
2005). Attending to these economic factors allows couples to
begin their marriage on a more financially stable foundation
(Smock et al. 2005), and also responds to contemporary
norms on not marrying until one is economically self-sufficient (Edin 2000; Whitehead and Popenoe 2001).
Hypothesis 2a Invisible assets such as savings will positively predict marriage for those that cohabit, but will be
unrelated to marriage for those that are not cohabiting.
Hypothesis 2b Hidden financial liabilities such as consumer debt will negatively predict marriage for those that
are cohabit, but will positively predict marriage for those
that are not cohabiting.
Cohabitation also serves as a transition period while
couples build financial stability. Individuals who want to
marry but are not financially able will often cohabit until
they are or as a means of economic survival (Oppenheimer
2003; Smock and Manning 1997; Snyder and McLaughlin
2006). Individuals who are already financially stable are
more likely to marry without first cohabiting—and this is
especially true for men (Oppenheimer 2003). Thus,
cohabitation before marriage may be a signal that a couple
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is not financially prepared for marriage. Consequently,
although cohabitation may allow individuals to gauge a
potential spouses’ financial behavior better, the decision to
cohabit may also be related to couples’ financial situations.
The Role of Gender
Finally, the association between financial issues and marriage may differ by gender. Although the majority of men
and women provide economic support to their families,
visible assets or conspicuous consumption might predict
marriage better for men than for women. Evolutionary
theories assert, and data has demonstrated, that women
value economic provision in potential spouses more than
men (Buss and Schmitt 1993; Buss et al. 2001). For
example, when asked to rate how important different
characteristics in a potential partner were, women rated
‘‘good economic prospects’’ almost twice as highly as men
(Buss and Schmitt 1993).
Men understand the role of economic signaling in
romantic relationships on both a conscious and subconscious level. For example, researchers asked individuals
to rate how distressed they would be if a hypothetical rival
for a romantic partner had better qualities than they did.
Men were more distressed when ‘‘the rival’’ had better
economic prospects than women were (Buss et al. 2000).
Even more fascinating was an experiment that manipulated men’s exposure to women. Participants were randomly assigned to complete a survey in one of two types of
rooms—a room composed of their same-sex counterparts
or a mixed-sex room. The male participants who were
randomly assigned to the mixed-sex testing room were
much more likely to rate having wealth, prestige, and
expensive clothing as important life goals compared to the
male participants who completed their survey in a samesex testing room (Roney 2003). By comparison, the
women’s answers regarding wealth, etc. did not vary
regardless of whether they completed their survey in a
mixed-sex or same-sex testing room. Since the participants
in this study were unaware of the experimental manipulation, this strongly suggests that the presence of women
influenced men to desire to exhibit economic prowess.
Hypothesis 3 Visible assets and consumer debt will
predict marriage more strongly for men than for women.

Method
Data and Sample
Data was drawn from the first two waves of the National
Survey of Family and Households (NSFH). The NSFH is a
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nationally-representative, longitudinal study that began in
1987 with over 13,000 participants (Sweet et al. 1988). Our
analysis included the 1,522 respondents who had never been
married at Wave 1 (W1, 1987) of the NSFH, who were
between the ages of 18 and 35, and who participated in Wave
2 (W2, 1992–1994). The respondents indicated whether they
were cohabiting with someone at the time of the W1 survey
and most of our analysis assessed the non-cohabiting and
cohabiting individuals separately to account for selection
and different possible endpoints.
We examined attrition to gauge how it might influence our
results. Of the 1,944 participants who met the age and nevermarried criteria, 422 left the sample between Waves 1 and 2.
Given that the two waves of the NSFH were 5 years apart, this
averages out to be a 4% per year attrition rate. Prior research
has found that cohabiting individuals have left the sample at
higher rates than other participants (Sassler and McNally
2003). In our sample, however, cohabiting individuals were
no more likely to leave the sample than non-cohabiting individuals. 22.1% of cohabitors left the sample compared to
21.6% of those who were not cohabiting. Sassler and McNally
(2003) used all of the cohabiting individuals in their analysis
of attrition, whereas we restricted our sample to young adults.
Because young adults often have less stable living arrangements and may be more difficult to follow over time, this
restriction may have equalized the likelihood that cohabiters
and non-cohabiters would leave the sample.
Some socioeconomic characteristics did predict attrition.
Participants with lower education and lower car values had
higher rates of attrition. Further, more young men than young
women left the sample and more African-Americans and
other race/ethnic minority participants left the sample relative to European-Americans. This differential attrition may
have implications for the findings. If it is the case that visible
assets predict marriage, by losing participants with lower car
values we may be underestimating the association between
visible assets and marriage. Further the greater attrition rates
of men and race/ethnic minority participants leaves us with a
less diverse and generalizable sample.
In addition, some of the participants did not answer all
of the questions. The items we used had between 0 and
15% missing. We used multiple imputation techniques to
generate plausible values. Multiple imputation is less likely
to bias a sample than list wise deletion (Rubin 1987).
Table 1 provides descriptive information about the key
variables in our sample. The first column provides the mean
and standard deviation for our full sample. Overall 22% of
the sample married between W1 and W2. The average consumer debt load was $571. The average value of the vehicle
in the sample $3,496 and participants had an average $2,900
in savings.
The next five columns provide the same descriptive
information for each of five groups based on the person’s
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status in W1 (not cohabiting or cohabiting) and their
relationship behaviors between W1 and W2. Of those who
were not cohabiting in W1, the group that went straight
into marriage without cohabiting worked more hours, had
higher occupational prestige scores, higher incomes, higher
average car values, and more consumer debt than either the
group that stayed single or the group who began cohabiting. Interestingly the only financial difference between W1
cohabiters who married their partners and W1 cohabiters
who did not was that cohabiters who married had higher
occupational prestige scores, and had cars that were worth
more. 43% of the cohabitors married their partner, whereas
only 18% of those who were not-cohabiting at W1 went
straight into marriage by W2. This difference reflects the
changes in the premarital role of cohabitation.
Measures
Dependent Variables
We used a non-proportional hazards model to examine
factors that influenced relationship transitions. Thus, the
dependent variable was the hazard of a union transition at
each month. To generate the hazard, we had to specify how
many months participants remained at risk of a union
transition before they actually made a transition. For those
who were not cohabiting at W1 of the NSFH, this was the
number of months between W1 of the NSFH and either
their first marriage, entrance into a cohabitation, or being
single in W2 of the NSFH (whichever came first). Using
the cohabitation and marriage histories that were taken at
both W1 and W2 we determined whether non-cohabiting
individuals entered cohabitation and/or marriage between
W1 and W2 and which of these transitions they made first.
Although those who began cohabiting between W1 and W2
were still at risk of marriage, we wanted to evaluate how
economic factors differentiated between them and those
who went straight into marriage without cohabiting. Thus,
going from non-cohabitation to cohabitation to marriage
was not an outcome that we analyzed, though we did
analyze the risk of going straight into marriage without
cohabitation relative to entering a cohabiting relationship.
For those who were cohabiting at W1 of the NSFH, we
specified the number of months between W1 of the NSFH
and either their marriage to their W1 partner, breaking up
with their W1 partner, or remaining cohabiting in W2 of
the NSFH (whichever event occurred first).
Independent Variables
To measure participants’ employment hours, we summed
their total number of self-reported ‘‘usual’’ weekly
employment hours from all of their jobs. We also included
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Wave 1 relationship status
Not cohabiting
W1 Variable

Work hours
Occupational prestige
Consumer debt
Vehicle value

Cohabiting

Full
sample

Relationship behavior W1–W2
Stayed
single

Began
cohabiting

Married (without
cohabiting)

Did not marry
partner

Married
partner

30.96

28.97

30.75

34.52a,b

30.37

34.51

(22.34)

(22.44)

(23.10)

(19.54)

(23.03)

(19.79)

27.40

25.67

24.80

31.54a,b

23.20

29.03c

(23.47)

(19.19)

(22.93)

(23.73)

(20.01)

22.38

a,b

$571

$472

$503

$884

$655

$635

($1,677)

($1,300)

($1,890)

($2,299)

($1,394)

($1,052)

$3,496

$2,914

$2,927

$5,175a,b

$3,697

$5,351c

($5,660)

($4,580)

($4,473)

($8,517)

($6,058)

($6,478)

Savings

$2,864

$3,050

$2,620

$3,091

$2,434

$3,091

Income

($8,768)
$10,157

($7,617)
$9,713

($9,263)
$9,410

($7,766)
$11,497a,b

($12,894)
$10,332

($7,057)
$12,775

($10,499)

($10,345)

($6,400)

($10,774)

($9,794)

($9,897)

12.89

13.00

12.74

13.46a,b

12.20

12.83c

Years of education

(2.18)

(2.22)

(2.06)

(2.18)

(2.09)

(2.21)

Age

25.05

26.04

24.28

24.24a

25.38

24.45

(4.51)

(4.82)

(4.13)

(4.27)

(4.65)

(3.64)

Male

48.0%

46.0%

48%

54.5%a

45.9%

42.6%

White

62.8%

54.7%

62.5%

74.8%

65.7%

87.0%

Black

28.0%

36.3%

28.9%

18.0%a,b

24.0%

6.5%c

Other race

9.2%

10.0%

9.6%

7.2%

10.3%

6.5%

481

222

146

% Married between W1 and W2

21.6%

17.5%

N

1,522

565

a

42.5%
108

Mean difference between those who married and those who stayed single significant at p \ .05

b

Mean difference between those who married and those who began to cohabit significant at p \ .05

c

Mean difference between those who married their partner and those who did not marry their partner significant at p \ .05

Note: standard deviations in parentheses

their occupational prestige score which the NSFH calculated
using their reported occupation. Based on the participants’
reported occupation, the NSFH assigned a numeric code that
indexed the status of their job (Stevens and Cho 1985).
Higher scores represented higher occupational prestige.
We had four financial variables in the models: consumer
debt, car value, savings, and income. Consumer debt was a
sum of participants’ credit card, installment loans
(excluding vehicle debt), and past-due bills. Participants
reported the value of their car. If they did not report owning
a car, they received a ‘‘0’’ for the car value variables. The
NSFH measured savings by asking participants about the
total amount in their savings accounts, savings bonds,
certificates of deposit, etc. For both the cohabiting and noncohabiting individuals, these financial variables measured
just the participant’s earned income, assets, debt, and car
value. Because the financial variables were highly skewed,

we use logged values of each of these variables. This
transformation provides a natural interpretation to the
coefficients such that they represent the percentage change
in the dependent variable associated with a one unit
increase in the variable of interest.
Education was participants’ number of completed years
of formal schooling. Age was their age in years at the W1
survey. Race was self-reported. Due to sample size limitations, we constructed two dummy variables for race—
African-American and Other Racial/Ethnic Minority. The
comparison category was European-American.
Analysis
The basic descriptive statistics in Table 1 suggest that the
likelihood of marriage was associated with a number of
financial and demographic characteristics of the individuals
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in our sample—especially for those who were not cohabiting. To test the mediation model, we first needed to show
that work hours predicted the purported mediators—consumer debt, car value, and savings (Baron and Kenny
1986). We used OLS regression to assess whether work
hours predicted these variables.
Once we established that work hours predicted the
mediators, we then used work hours and the mediators to
predict the hazard of marriage. Because the NSFH surveyed
individuals prior to marriage, and provided information on
the timing of marriage, we used a non-proportional hazards
model to examine the characteristics that predicted an
increased hazard of marriage entry. We had planned on using
proportional hazards regression. However, preliminary
analyses showed that the models did not meet the proportionality assumption—in particular the shape of the hazard
varied over time (Allison 1995; Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002).
To statistically correct this, we interacted time with the
independent variables and include these interactions in all of
the models (Allison 1995).
In the first model, we assessed the relationship between
work hours, occupational prestige, and the likelihood of
marriage. In the second model, we added the individual’s
financial position such as income, education, consumer
debt, savings, and value of the individual’s car. In the third
model, we included interaction terms between these measures and the participant’s gender
We ran these analyses separately based on whether the
respondent was cohabiting or not at the time of W1. Individuals who were not cohabiting at W1 had more than one
possible end state at W2 (stay single, get married, or begin to
cohabit) whereas individuals who were cohabiting at W1 had
only two end states (get married or break up the cohabitation). Although a third possibility for cohabitors existed—
remain with one’s partner between W1 and W2—only 49
cohabiters were still cohabiting with their W1 partner in W2.
Because these individuals were at risk of marriage for the
entire study period but experienced no event, they were
treated as uncensored and their relationship survival time
was the number of months between W1 and W2.
We also ran the groups separately because cohabitation
provides a different set of information about financial
issues to the individual’s partner. For example, consumer
debt is easily hidden from a girlfriend/boyfriend but such
secrecy may be more difficult in a cohabiting relationship.
Finally, we separated the groups because financial issues
may influence whether couples cohabit.

Results
First, we examined whether work hours and occupational
prestige predicted the variables we thought would function

123

J Fam Econ Iss (2011) 32:424–436

as mediators—an assumption of the mediating model—
using the full sample. Hours of employment predicted the
financial variables in the OLS regressions (analysis not
shown). For example, an extra 10 h of work per week was
associated with a 1.1% higher car value and a .8% higher
amount of savings (p \ .01 in both cases). In addition, a
unit increase in occupational prestige was associated with a
.9% higher car value and .6% higher consumer debt. These
results are all based on regressions in which we controlled
for the individual’s log income and education (both of
which are positively correlated with savings and car value).
In addition, we controlled for age, race, gender, and relationship status in W1.
Next, we tested whether the main independent variables
(employment hours and occupational prestige) were associated with the dependent variable (the hazard of marriage).
Table 2 shows the non-proportional hazards regression for
individuals who were not cohabiting in Wave 1. We ran two
analyses for each model—one comparing the hazard of
moving straight into marriage relative to staying single and
the other relative to beginning to cohabit.
Marriage vs. Staying Single
Work hours positively predicted the likelihood of marriage
(Table 2, Model 1a). For every 1 h increase in regular
hours worked, the odds of the marriage increased by 2%.
Occupational prestige was also positively associated with
the likelihood of marriage. However, both a negative work
hour by time interaction and a negative occupational
prestige by time interaction emerged, indicating that as the
participants remained single longer, the relationship
between work hours, occupational prestige, and the likelihood of marriage declined. Age and ethnic minority status
were negatively associated with marriage.
We next added assets, consumer debt, income and
education to test whether they functioned as mediators. A
mediator would be associated with the hazard of marriage
and would reduce the association between employment
hours and marriage (Baron and Kenny 1986). Both income
and car value positively predicted marriage (though the car
value coefficient was only significant at the 10% level).
The interaction between time and consumer debt, car value
and education all positively predicted marriage (Table 3,
Model 2a). Despite the positive relationship between these
variables and the hazard of marriage, including these
variables did not reduce the relationship between work
hours, occupational prestige, and marriage. Consequently,
we rejected Hypotheses 1a 1b, and 1c that visible assets
and consumer debt would mediate the work hour/marriage
relationship. Rather than mediate the association between
employment and marriage, these financial and human
capital variables simply had an additive effect.
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Table 2 The relationship between assets, debts, and the likelihood of marriage for individuals who were not cohabiting at W1
Variables

Marriage relative to staying single
Model 1a

Work hours

Hazard
ratio

S.E. Hazard
ratio

1.02**

.004 1.02**
.005

Work hours * time

.94**

Occupation prestige

1.01**

Occupation prestige * time

Model 2a

.98**

.93**

Marriage relative to starting to cohabit
Model 3a

S.E. Hazard
ratio

Model 1b

Model 2b

Model 3b

S.E. Hazard
ratio

S.E. Hazard
ratio

S.E. Hazard
ratio

S.E.

.004 1.02**

.004 1.00

.004 1.00

.004 1.00

.004

.005

.005

.004

.004

.005

.93**

.97**

.97**

.97**

.004 1.01**

.004 1.01**

.004 1.00

.004 1.00

.004 1.00

.004

.97**

.004

.97**

.004

.003

.003

.98

.05

.99

.05

1.02

.05

1.01

.05

Consumer debt
Car value

.98**

.97**

.004

.97**

.005

1.09

.05

1.09

.05

1.22**

.06

1.22**

.06

Savings

.92

.05

.94

.05

.98

.04

.99

.05

Income

1.19**

.06

1.16*

.06

1.06

.06

1.06

.06

.98

.04

.97

.04

1.05

.04

1.05

.04

Cons. debt * time

1.25**

.06

1.20**

.06

1.07

.06

1.08

.06

Car value * time

1.14*

.06

1.15*

.06

1.08

.06

1.09

.07

Savings * time

1.12

.07

1.09

.07

.96

.06

.95

.06

.98

.07

1.02

.08

1.06

.07

1.06

.07

1.22**

.04

1.23**
1.00

.05
.11

1.06

.04

1.05
1.06

.05
.11

Male * car value

.94

.10

1.05

.11

Male * savings

.94

.09

.85

.10

Male * cons. debt * time

1.13

.13

.98

.14

Male * car value * time

1.06

.11

.85

.11

1.25

.12

Education

Income * time
Education * time
Male * cons. debt

Male * savings * time

1.19

.11

Age

.91**

.02

.93**

.02

.94**

.02

.97

.02

.97

.02

.98

.02

Malea

.90

.15

.86

.15

.95

.17

1.12

.14

1.00

.15

1.00

.16

Blackb

.60**

.19

.76

.20

.79

.21

.70

.20

.84

.21

.84

.21

Other raceb

.51*

.27

.43**

.29

.48**

.29

.84

.28

1.06

.28

1.07

.28

Change in the likelihood 660.55**
ratio
a

Comparison category is female;

b

86.13**

7.35

321.69**

32.50**

8.42

comparison category is White, Non-Hispanic

p \ .10, * p \ .05. ** p \ .01
N = 1,268

To illustrate the relationship between the significant
financial variables and the hazard of marriage, we graphed
predicted hazard ratios for eight hypothetical individuals.
We gave them all the means of age (25) and log income
(4.0), and then varied either their employment hours (0 10,
20, or 30 h weekly) or the value of their cars ($0, $2,000,
$4,000, or $10,000). These graphs are Figs. 1 and 2,
respectively.
Figure 1 shows that work hours had a strong correlation
with the likelihood of marriage For example, the group that
is working 30 h per week at month 6 has a predicted hazard
ratio of 18, whereas those who are not working have a
hazard ratio of .37. The difference between the working
groups quickly diminishes, however, illustrating the negative time by work hours interaction. By month 24, no group

has a hazard ratio above 2, though the group working 30 h
per week is still the most likely to wed.
By way of contrast, Fig. 2 shows that the influence of
car values increases over time. Having a car slightly
depresses the predicted hazard ratio of marriage until about
the 18th month. After the 18th month, having a car
increases the likelihood of marriage. We should note that
the baseline hazard of marriage is depressed below the
standard 1.0 because we held these trends at the mean age
and age was negatively associated with the hazard of
marriage. But overall, this graph demonstrates that as time
goes on, car values increase the likelihood of marriage.
Although other interaction findings were significant, we
decided not to graph them. We wanted to keep the findings
as parsimonious as possible.
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Table 3 The relationship between assets, debts, and the likelihood of marriage for individuals who were cohabiting at W1
Variables

Model 1

Work hours
Work hours * time
Occupation prestige * time

Model 3

Hazard ratio

S.E.

Hazard ratio

S.E.

Hazard ratio

S.E.

1.02**

.007

1.02**

.007

1.02**

.007

.95***

Occupation prestige

Model 2

.007

1.01*

.006

.99

.006

.95***
1.01
.98*

.007
.006
.007

.95***
1.01
.98*

.008
.007
.007

Consumer debt

1.04

.08

1.07

Car value

1.05

.09

1.03

.08
.09

Savings
Income

1.08
.87

.09
.09

1.08
.90

.09
.09

Education

.97

.06

1.02

.06

Cons. debt * time

.99

.09

.96

.09

Car value * time

1.14

.08

1.20

.09

Savings * time

1.14

.10

1.19

.10

Income * time

1.04

.07

1.05

.08

Education * time

1.05

.05

.96

.06

Male * cons. debt

.83

.17

Male * car value

1.28

.18

Male * savings

.60**

.16

Male * cons. debt * time

1.30

.19

Male * car value * time

1.00

.19

1.20

.22

Male * savings * time
Age

.96

.03

.95

.03

Malea
Blackb

.90
.35**

.23
.41

.89
.52

.23
.43

1.02
.52

.27
.44

Other raceb

.55

.51

.71

.53

.78

.48

a

Comparison category is female;

b

.93*

.03

Comparison category is White, Non-Hispanic

p \ .10. * p \ .05. ** p \ .01, *** p \ .001
N = 254

Fig. 1 Predicted hazard ratios of marriage for those who were not
cohabiting at W1 of the NSFH by hours of employment
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Fig. 2 Predicted hazard ratios of marriage for those who were not
cohabiting at W1 of the NSFH by car value
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In our final model, we examined whether gender moderated the association between the financial variables and
marriage. That is, we tested whether the effect of these
variables on marriage varied by gender. No significant
gender interaction terms emerged (Table 2, Model 3a)
except a marginally significant gender difference in the
time-saving interaction term. Adding the gender interaction
terms did not increase the fit of the model.
Marriage vs. Starting to Cohabit
We also compared individuals who were single at W1 who
went straight into marriage with those who began a
cohabiting relationship. Neither work hours nor occupational prestige predicted marriage relative to beginning a
cohabiting relationship (Table 2, Model 1b). Negative
work hour by time and occupational prestige by time
interactions emerged as significant, though.
Although adding the other financial variables increased
the model fit, only one variable was significant (Table 2,
Model 2b). Participants’ car values were positively associated with the hazard of going straight to marriage rather than
beginning a cohabiting relationship. Adding the gender
terms in the third model did not add to the model fit, nor were
any of the coefficients significant (Table 2, Model 3b).
To summarize the findings for those who were not
cohabiting in W1 of the NSFH, the financial variables that
mattered depended on whether those who went straight into
marriage were being compared to individuals who stayed
single or those who began cohabiting. Compared to those
who stayed single, work hours and occupational prestige
positively predicted the likelihood of marriage. This was
only true initially, however, as the relationship between
work hours and occupation prestige declined over time. Car
values increased the likelihood of marriage over time even
after controlling for work hours and occupational prestige,
as did consumer debt, savings, and education.
Only one financial variable distinguished between those
who began cohabiting and those who went directly into
marriage—car value. At every month at risk, a 10%
increase in car values increased the likelihood of marriage
by 2.2% relative to the likelihood of beginning to cohabit
(controlling for work hours and occupational prestige).
For both analyses (marriage vs. staying single and
marriage vs. cohabitation) the financial variables did not
mediate the association between work hours, occupational
prestige, and marriage contrary to what we had expected.
Further, gender was unrelated to the hazard of marriage.
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and occupational prestige predicted the hazard of marriage
for cohabiting individuals (Table 3, Model 1). Every one
hour increase of employment was associated with a 2%
increase in the odds of marriage (p \ .05), and a one-point
increase in occupational prestige was associated with a 1%
increase in the odds of marriage. However, like the participants who were not cohabiting at W1, negative work by
time and negative occupational prestige by time interactions emerged.
In the second model we added assets, debt, and education. Adding the debt and asset terms did not mediate the
association between work hours, occupational prestige, and
the hazard of marriage (Table 3, Model 2). In fact, the
income, education, assets, and debt variables all failed to
attain statistical significance (though the car value by time
and savings by time interactions were marginally significant). Thus, work hours and occupational prestige were
extremely important predictors of the hazard of marriage
among cohabiting couples.
Only one gender interaction term was significant—a
negative male by savings interaction (Table 3, Model 3).
The cohabiting men most likely to marry were those with
low levels of savings (contrary to what we hypothesized).
The results were reversed for women. Women with high
levels of savings were most likely to marry. This relationship is graphed in Figs. 3 and 4. Figure 3 shows that
cohabiting men with savings were less likely to marry than
those without savings. Over time, men with savings had an
improved likelihood of marriage. Figure 4 shows that
cohabiting women with savings, on the other hand, were
more likely to marry than those without savings. Further,
the association between savings and the hazard ratio of
marriage increased over time. Like Fig. 2, because we
didn’t want to complicate the graph of these relationships,
we removed work and occupational prestige from Figs. 3

Marrying among W1 cohabitors
We now turn to the findings for the participants who were
already cohabiting at W1. Table 3 shows that work hours

Fig. 3 Predicted hazard ratios of marriage for cohabiting men based
on W1 savings levels
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Fig. 4 Predicted hazard ratios of marriage for cohabiting women
based on W1 savings levels

and 4. Thus, the Y-axis of Fig. 2 has a low overall hazard
of marriage. These two panels would be the graph for
cohabiting men and women without any employment.

Discussion
Using prospective nationally representative data, this study
examined the processes that link financial wellbeing and
the likelihood of marriage. Findings indicated that
employment hours and occupational prestige were important predictors of future marriage, like previous studies
have shown. However, other indicators of financial wellbeing were also related to marriage for those who were not
cohabiting at W1. Visible financial markers such as the
value of one’s car positively predicted the likelihood of
marriage. Over time, consumer debt, income, and education also became stronger predictors of the likelihood of
marriage relative to staying single. Contrary to what we
had predicted, however, these financial variables did not
mediate the association between employment and marriage, rather they complemented employment. For individuals who were cohabiting at W1 of the NSFH, only
employment and occupational prestige predicted marriage
although the role of savings did vary by gender.
These findings suggest a refinement to the timing of
marriage theory (Oppenheimer 1988). Although employment hours predict marriage, financial resources also predict marriage after accounting for employment. This
finding suggests that individuals who do not cohabit prior
to marriage may use visible financial resources to augment
their employment’s signal of economic viability. Further,
income and consumer debt also became stronger predictors
of marriage over time, suggesting that non-cohabitors
might use consumption as an economic signal. Thus,
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individuals may not use economic signals in place of
occupational prowess, but in addition to it.
We thought the financial variables would mediate the
association between employment hours, occupational
prestige, and marriage, but the findings did not support this
mediating model. It is possible that money may not be as
‘‘taboo’’ an issue as scholars have suggested. Individuals
who are considering marriage may talk about their
employment and income issues. However, financial issues
such as visible assets and consumption may still complement or augment their financial discussions.
Interestingly, the financial variables increased their
ability to predict the likelihood of marriage over time
whereas work hours and occupational prestige quickly
diminished. This may indicate that those who worked many
hours quickly married and thus selected out of the group
that was ‘‘at risk’’ of marrying. Alternatively, this finding
might signify that for individuals who may not have high
employment hours or occupational prestige, economic
signaling using other mechanisms such as the values of
their cars was a successful strategy.
For individuals who were cohabiting at W1, the theory
of marital timing fit nicely. Except for savings, employment hours and occupational prestige were the only predictors of marriage. Cohabitors may not need to use
economic signals since they are better able to understand
their partner’s financial situation. Further, if both partners
are looking forward to marriage, they may be working
together to establish an economic base (Smock et al. 2005).
If this were the case then the cohabiting partners would be
intimately knowledgeable about each other’s financial
situation.
Our quantitative findings regarding cohabiting couples
verified past qualitative studies. These studies have shown
that although cohabiting couples want stable employment
before they will marry, they also have other financial
aspirations—such as savings—that are important prerequisites to marriage (Edin 2000; Smock et al. 2005). Our
findings showed that cohabiting women’s savings positively predicted marriage. Although savings did not
mediate the association between employment and marriage, they were important predictors. Cohabiting couples
may indeed wait to marry in order to build up savings.
Interestingly, though, this finding was gendered.
Cohabiting women with savings were more likely to wed
but the reverse was true for cohabiting men. Cohabitation
may give women more control in the progression to marriage because cohabitation may enhance the value of
women’s economic contributions to relationships (see Edin
2000). Cohabiting may somehow elevate women’s savings
as a signal of financial stability. Cohabiting men trying to
make ends meet may quickly realize how valuable
women’s economic contribution can be.
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This study has limitations which temper the conclusions
we draw. First, as we noted before, individuals do not
randomly select into cohabitation. Consequently, the differences in findings between the cohabiting and noncohabiting individuals may not be due to the cohabitation
itself, but to other characteristics that make them differentially select into cohabitation. For example, employment
may have been the best predictor for cohabiting couples
simply because those who cohabit have a harder time
securing stable employment (Oppenheimer 2003).
A second limitation is the age of the data. Wave 1 of the
NSFH was conducted in 1987 and Wave 2 in 1992–1994.
Consequently, these findings may or may not generalize
well to current young adults in the US. We do not feel that
this is too problematic because the age of marriage has
continued to rise since 1992 and economic concerns have
become more prominent (Whitehead and Popenoe 2001).
Thus, these findings might still reflect contemporary union
formation. Further, the advantages of the NSFH for
investigating these particular research questions outweighed the disadvantage of the data’s age.
Finally, we cannot control any spurious relationship
between financial issues and marriage. For example, some
individuals may have personality traits that lead them to
not invest in visible assets. These same traits may cause
them to deemphasize marriage or make it more difficult for
them to marry. Thus, factors that we did not observe may
actually create the appearance of a relationship between
financial issues and marriage that might not actually exist.
Despite these limitations, this study contributes to the
literature on family formation by showing that financial
issues beyond employment are related to marriage.
Although employment is extremely important, visible signals of economic standing such as owning a (nicer) car may
also play a role for individuals who do not cohabit. Further,
although savings did not supplant the importance of
employment hours for cohabiting couples, they complemented it.
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